Loren Brandt教授分享JDE(2012)创作心得 Loren Brandt on JDE (2012)
本文最初于 2025 年 1 月 28 日 发布于微信公众号 Impactful Research；2026 年 4 月 28 日 同步至本网站。
Originally published on the WeChat official account Impactful Research on 2025-01-28; mirrored to this website on 2026-04-28.
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这个公众号的第二十四篇文章，我们很荣幸邀请到多伦多大学的Loren Brandt教授分享他2012年发表在顶刊 **Journal of Development Economics**上的**
**“Creative accounting or creative destruction? Firm-level productivity growth in Chinese manufacturing” 的创作心得** ，万字采访，干货满满！
同时也祝大家除夕快乐，蛇年大吉！🎉🧧
以下是Loren Brandt教授分享关于Creative accounting or creative destruction? Firm-level productivity growth in Chinese manufacturing 这篇文章的创作心得。
本文正文内容约一万五千字，全文阅读需约40分钟
#本期访谈主要问题
1. 是什么启发您开始写作关于中国企业生产率分析的 JDE 论文？
2. 关于您JDE 论文的真正研究动机是什么？是为了回答一些特定的重要研究问题，还是为了做好企业层面全要素生产率估计的基础性描述工作？
3. 其他研究可能会识别一些因果关系，比如什么因素导致了某个结果，或者为什么会出现某个现象。感觉您做这类研究不一定是为了找出因果关系，而更多的是为了发现一些正确的实际情况，并描述它。这么理解对吗？
4. 从世界范围来看，研究中国企业层面的数据真的很难吗？还是说在大多数国家研究企业层面的数据都很难？
5. 很多人引用您的JDE文章并说您文章中用非常复杂的方法构建了跨年公司关联的非平衡面板。您在数据构建中遇到最大的困难是什么？
6. 除此之外，您在本文的撰写和修改过程中遇到的最大的挑战是什么？（例如数据清洗、平减指数计算等问题）
7. 您认为让这篇文章这么有影响力的主要原因是什么？
8. 除了这些数据本身之外，它传达的信息也很重要。但似乎其中信息还没有被学术界完全理解，对吗？
9. 对于动态过程或资源配置的研究，您也有一篇关于农业资源配置的论文。能否分享一下您的想法，比如在这个领域中的研究难题或关键兴趣点？可以鼓励更多年轻人关注这个研究领域。
- 您觉得应该如何提出新的研究想法？
Q1：是什么启发您开始写作关于中国企业生产率分析的 JDE 论文[1]** ？
**Q1:What inspired your JDE paper on analyzing firm-level productivity in China?
我非常高兴能谈论这篇论文。当我们在2000年代初期开始这项研究时，中国针对企业层面的分析还相对较少。国家统计局（NBS）已经收集了很长时间的企业层面数据，但大多数数据都是经过汇总后以较高的层次呈现的。例如，数据可能会汇总为所有国有企业在某一行业中的情况，或所有非国有企业的整体情况。因此，大部分分析都是在较为宏观的层面上进行的。虽然这些分析很有意义，但它们通常只是告诉我们国有部门和非国有部门之间生产率变化的趋势，而并没有从企业层面去分析。
I’m certainly delighted to talk about this paper. When we started working on this, probably in the early 2000s, there just wasn’t much analysis at the firm level in China. The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) had been collecting firm-level data for a long time, but most of what was available was aggregated and presented in yearbooks at a higher level. For example, the data might be aggregated for all state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in a particular industry, or for non-state-owned enterprises as a whole. So, most of the analysis at that time was done at a very aggregate level. While these analyses were useful, they often only told us about productivity trends in the state sector versus the non-state sector, rather than looking at firms individually.
然而，随着时间的推移，一些企业层级的数据也变得可得。 例如，Gary Jefferson长期与中国国家统计局合作，他与中国的合作者使用了一份涵盖约25,000到30,000家中型和大型企业的大样本数据集。这对了解中国的工业情况非常有价值。然而，这个数据集排除了大量的小型企业，而这些小企业中有很多最终会成长为大型企业。
However, some firm-level data was starting to become available as time went by. For example, Gary Jefferson had a long collaboration with the NBS. He and his Chinese collaborators used data from a large sample of medium and large firms, roughly 25,000 to 30,000 firms, which was incredibly valuable for understanding Chinese industry. But this dataset excluded a large number of smaller firms, many of which would eventually grow into much larger firms.
在1980年代和1990年代，还有一些其他影响力较大的企业层级数据收集工作。例如，加利福尼亚大学圣地亚哥分校的Barry Naughton和他的团队与中国社会科学院的董辅礽合作，在1990年代初进行了一个关于国有企业和国有企业改革的调查。尽管这个样本较小，只有大约750家企业，但它对理解国有企业改革有着重要的影响。此外，还有一些关于乡镇和村企业（TVEs）的较小数据集，但总体来说，企业层面的详细数据并不多。
In the 1980s and 1990s, there were other influential efforts to collect firm-level data. Barry Naughton and a group at UC San Diego, for example, worked with Dong Fureng at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences to conduct a survey in the early 1990s on SOEs and the evolution of reforms in the state-owned sector. It was a small sample, about 750 firms, but it was influential in understanding SOE reforms. There were also smaller datasets on township and village enterprises (TVEs), but in general, there wasn’t much detailed firm-level data.
1990年代初期，我有机会开始访问企业。我和一个上海的团队合作，开展了一次针对中国企业的调查。尽管样本很小，仅约250家企业，但这是我第一次有机会深入与企业交流，并开始认真思考调查设计和数据收集的问题。从这个角度出发，结合我对公司在政策环境中如何运作和互动的直觉，我逐渐意识到我需要更详细的数据。
In the early 1990s, I had the opportunity to start visiting firms. I worked with a team in Shanghai to conduct a survey of Chinese companies. Although it was a small sample—about 250 firms — it gave me my first real opportunity to extensively talk to firms and think seriously about survey design and data collection. So, from that perspective, along with my own intuition about how I thought firms were behaving and interacting in the policy environment, I began to see the need for more detailed data.
真正促使这篇论文完成的因素有几个。一个关键因素是张轶凡，他当时是我一个好朋友Thomas Rawski的博士生。那时中国的企业级别数据逐渐变得更加可得，同时张轶凡对这个机会非常敏锐，他在这些数据刚刚进入公共领域时，便积极着手获取并不断积累。
What really made this paper come together were several factors. One key factor was Yifan, who was a PhD student of a good friend of mine, Thomas Rawski. There was a time when firm-level data was becoming more available, and Yifan was very aware of that. He started acquiring and accumulating this data as it became accessible in the public domain.
另一个关键人物是我以前的同事Jo Van Biesebroeck，他曾和我在多伦多大学共事约十年。Jo是企业层面全要素生产率研究的专家，他的博士论文就是关于此。他还在非洲做过企业层面生产率和出口的研究。我和Jo意识到张轶凡收集的企业层级数据是我们可以利用的资源。这是一个非常好的机会去探讨一些有趣的问题。Jo在全要素生产率的研究方面有丰富的经验，而我也有一些相关经验，尽管我的早期研究主要集中在农业，而非企业。
Another key person was my former colleague, Jo Van Biesebroeck, who had worked with me at the University of Toronto for about ten years. Jo had an extensive knowledge of productivity, having written his dissertation on the topic. He had also worked on firm-level productivity and exporting in Africa. Jo and I realized that the enterprise-level data that Yifan had started to collect was a resource we could leverage. It was a great opportunity to explore some interesting questions. Jo had a lot of expertise in productivity, while I had some experience in the field as well, although my earlier work had focused on farms rather than firms.
所以，这篇文章的动机是识别有趣的问题、获取正确数据、并与互补的学者合作的结合。我认为，这个项目的成功正是我整个职业生涯的一个缩影——找到重要的问题，识别数据源，并将合适的人聚集在一起，共同解决重要的问题。
So, it was a combination of recognizing interesting questions, having access to the right data, and identifying the right collaborators with complementary skills that allowed us to move forward with this project. I think this is a great example of how my career has evolved—finding important questions, identifying data sources, and bringing together the right people to work on important issues.
Q2：那么关于您JDE 论文的真正研究动机是什么？是为了回答一些特定的重要研究问题，还是为了做好企业层面全要素生产率估计的基础性描述工作？
Q2: What really motivates your JDE paper? Is it to answer important research questions, or to do some fundamental description work for firm-level TFP?
曾经有一种普遍认识是中国工业，特别是制造业的生产率增长相当迅速。然而，当时很难确定到底有多快。当我刚加入多伦多大学时的前五到十年里，我教授了一门关于中日经济发展的为期一年的课程。通过这门课程，我学到了很多关于日本发展经验的知识，特别是日本制造业的成功。一部分内容涉及历史分析，但更多的是关注日本在1950年代、1960年代和1970年代所经历的显著增长。
当我开始研究中国时，我已经有了一个感觉——中国的制造业部门正在快速增长。而通过与企业的互动，我更直观地感受到中国企业充满了活力。
As you know, there was a sense that productivity growth in Chinese industry, particularly in manufacturing, had been fairly rapid. How rapid, however, was hard to say at the time. In my first five or ten years at the University of Toronto, I taught a year-long course on the economic development of both China and Japan. Through that, I learned a lot about Japan’s development experience, particularly the success of Japan’s manufacturing sector. Some of this was historical, but a lot of it focused on the impressive growth Japan experienced in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s.By the time I started working on China, I already had a sense that China’s manufacturing sector was growing very rapidly. From my interactions with firms, I could see there was a tremendous amount of dynamism.
你可以开始观察到一些代表成功的指标，比如在国际市场上的竞争力。但当时，我们并没有完全理解这种增长的来源，也不清楚生产率增长在其中所扮演的重要角色。我们不知道哪些企业在推动这种增长。例如，这篇论文的一个主要发现是新企业对于TFP的增长极为重要，但是当这个项目开始之初，我不确定我们是否考虑过这个假设。
You could begin to observe the indicators of success, like the ability to compete in international markets. But at that time, we didn’t fully understand where this growth was coming from or how important productivity growth was as a contributing factor. We didn’t know which firms were driving this growth. For example, one of the main findings from the paper was that new firms had been extremely important, but when we started, I’m not sure whether we had that hypothesis.
因此，在研究开始之前，我们并未预设或明确假设新企业是推动全要素生产率（TFP）增长的重要力量之一。如果我这么说，“哦，是的，我们认为新公司很重要，我们也证实了这一点”，这好像是不错的论文写法，但研究开展的事实并非如此。我们是抱着我们并不知道真实情况是如何的态度开始在研究中进行探索。这包含了持续的不同观点的互动——一方面是阅读其他国家的经验，另一方面是观察中国发生的事情，再加上与数据的相互验证。 你从自己进行的描述性分析中学到了很多东西，有时候这些东西揭示了问题，也展示了研究机会。正是这些研究中的重要要素——阅读、观察、访问企业和分析数据的相互影响与作用，最终促成了这篇论文的完成。
I’m not sure that when we started, we knew or even had the hypothesis that new firms were important and would be as much of a driving force as they turned out to be. It would be nice for me to say, “Oh yes, we thought new firms were important and we validated that,” but probably not. We were more agnostic about it. But there was always this continual interaction between reading what goes on in other countries, observing what’s happening in China, and interacting with the data. You learn things from the descriptive exercises that you do, and sometimes these things identify problems but also opportunities. It’s an interaction between all of these elements—reading, observing, visiting firms, and analyzing data—that ultimately contributed to the paper.
Q3：其他研究可能会识别一些因果关系，比如什么因素导致了某个结果，或者为什么会出现某个现象。从我和您的合作经验来看，我感觉您做这类研究不一定是为了找出因果关系，而更多的是为了发现一些正确的实际情况，并描述它。我这么理解对吗？
Q3:For other research, they may identify some causality, such as what factors influence certain outcomes or why something happens. From my experience with you, I feel like your research is not necessarily about finding the cause; it’s more about finding certain true facts or describing those facts.
不准确。正如我提到的，我认为这是多种因素的综合。我在职业生涯早期就意识到识别因果关系是非常困难的。甚至在谈论因果关系之前，你需要先有一组描述性的“典型事实”——我们都能达成一致并能够解释的事实。 如果没有一组大家都同意的典型事实，我们又怎么能够解释任何事情呢？我们究竟想解释什么，我们又在尝试揭示什么样的因果机制呢？
Not exactly. As I mentioned, I would say it’s a combination of things. What I learned very early in my career is that identifying causality can be extremely difficult. Even before talking about causality, you need to have a descriptive set of what I’ll call stylized facts—facts that we can all agree on and explain. Without an agreed-upon set of stylized facts, how can we explain anything? What exactly do we want to explain, and what causal mechanisms are we trying to uncover?
例如在新企业与全要素生产率的研究中，我们首先明确了新企业确实很重要。我与Kjetil和Geuorgui合作的后续研究，在《the Review of Economic Studies》上发表的那篇论文[2]，就受到了与Jo、张轶凡和王璐航的早期合作研究的启发。我们的目标是识别是否有某种因果关系，解释新企业在不同地区或不同时间段所扮演角色的差异。如果没有之前的这些研究工作，后面的论文是无法完成的。
In this context, we went ahead and established that new firms are really important. Later work that I did with Kjetil and Geuorgui, for example, in a paper that was published in the Review of Economic Studies, was motivated by some of the earlier work with Jo, Yifan, and Luhang. It was trying to identify whether there is something causal underlying the differences in the role new firms play across regions or over time. That paper would not have been possible without all of the earlier work that had been done.
这使我们能够有一定信心地说，生产率增长是存在的，而新企业确实很重要。接下来，我们可以开始解释为什么新企业变得重要，以及是什么潜在因素——无论是空间差异还是与时间相关的变化——帮助缓解了一些制约新企业进入的因素。这点你是对的，我更加喜欢从一组我相信的实证发现和典型事实开始。
It allowed us to say with some degree of confidence that there was productivity growth, and new firms were important. Then, we could begin to explain why new firms became important and what underlying factors—whether spatial differences or time-related changes—helped relax some of the constraints. You’re absolutely right, I’m much more comfortable starting with a set of empirical observations and stylized facts that I’m confident in.**
但确保这些事实的准确性本身就是一项重要任务。一旦我们完成了这一点，就可以开始寻找可以解释这些观察结果的影响因素。在中国的背景下，明确事实并达成共识似乎是研究的第一步。因为中国发展得非常迅速——有太多变化在发生。我们实际上是在尝试记录一个快速演变的过程。
But getting those facts right is a major task in itself. Once we’ve done that, we can start looking for causal factors that help explain those observations. Having the facts first, and agreeing on them, seems to be the first step in the context of China. Because China was moving so quickly—there was so much happening. We were trying to document something that was evolving at a very fast pace.
我们并不总是拥有完美的数据来捕捉这些变化，虽然中国的统计机构已经竭尽全力，但这列经济火车实在前进得太快。所以，我们不得不花费很多时间来确保事实的准确性。我可以说，我这些年来做的几乎所有工作——无论是最近关于农业资源错配和产权的研究，还是宏观经济周期的研究，或者是繁荣与衰退的周期——都建立在花费大量时间和精力确保事实的准确性的基础上。
We didn’t always have perfect data to capture it. Although statistical agencies in China were doing their best, but the train was moving very fast. So, you have to spend a lot of time getting the facts right.I would say that almost everything I’ve done over the years—whether it’s the more recent work on misallocation in agriculture and property rights, or work on macroeconomic cycles, or the boom-bust cycles—has been built on a massive amount of time and energy devoted to getting the facts right.
让我们先确立一组事实，对这些事实的准确性有信心，并弄清楚生产这些数据的底层机制和政策。然后，我们可以看看是否能够构建出一个逻辑上连贯的经济故事，将所有要素有机地联系起来。这些要素——实证发现、典型事实和理论解释——之间总是存在这种互动，是这种互动最终促成了这项研究。
Let’s establish a set of facts, be comfortable with them, and be confident in the underlying institutions and policies that might be generating the data we observe. Then, we can see if we can construct a logically coherent narrative that ties all these elements together. There’s always this interaction between all these elements—empirical observations, stylized facts, and theoretical explanations—that ultimately contributes to the work.
Q4：从世界范围来看，研究中国企业层面的数据真的很难吗？还是说在大多数国家研究企业层面的数据都很难？
Q4: From around the world, is it really difficult to study Chinese firm-level data? Or is it difficult in most countries?
在许多国家，获取开展类似研究所需的公司级数据非常困难。这与公开要求、调查数据的特点以及隐私问题有关。相比之下，美国的研究相对更多，因为可以访问经过匿名化处理的企业普查数据，人们可以通过统计机构访问和使用公司级别的数据。但这可能更多是例外而非常态。
Now, I would say that in many countries, it’s very difficult to access the kind of firm-level data needed to conduct such research. It’s just the nature of reporting requirements, the nature of primary data, and privacy issues. A lot of work is done in the United States, where people have access to U.S. census data. A lot of that is anonymized, so people can access it through statistical agencies, allowing them to work with firm-level data. But that’s probably the exception rather than the rule.
今天，在许多国家，尤其是高收入国家，已经有更多种类的行政数据可供使用。但我仍然认为，我们围绕中国进行经济学研究的学者是幸运的，因为一些行政数据得以开放使用，而且这些数据还具有较长的时间跨度。
Today, there are many more forms of administrative data available in various countries, particularly for high-income nations to use. But yes, I would say we were fortunate in China in many ways that such data became available, data that could be used and constructed for relatively long periods of time.
在JDE的论文中，我们也做了和其他国家的比较，研究了针对其他国家的研究，并发现了一些类似的学术成果，例如日本和韩国。然而，所有这些工作的核心是能够访问企业层面的数据。这是关键，我们有幸能够在特定时间段内访问到这些公司级数据。
You know, in the JDE paper, we looked for comparisons with other countries, examined analysis on other countries, and found similar kinds of work that had been done for countries like Japan and Korea. But the key to all of this was having access to firm-level data. That was the key, and we were fortunate, at least during this window of time, to have access to firm-level data that allowed us to address that.
如果你仔细想想，关于中国的农业问题也是如此。农研中心收集并公开的农户调查数据，为我们提供了有关中国农村的大量信息，包括农业生产力、产权和收入分配等。
If you think about it, it’s the same with respect to farms in China. The survey data collected by the Research Center for Rural Economy, which made its way into the public domain, provided us with so much of what we know about rural China—agricultural productivity, property rights, and income distribution.
我还要用另一个例子来阐述获得全国的企业层面数据为我们提供了许多解决重要问题的机会。以我现在与亚洲发展银行和国研中心合作开展的项目为例，我最大的建议仍然是研究人员必须能够获得企业层面数据，这至关重要。你可以就政府应采取的行动提出各种政策建议，但政策建议的质量取决于这些建议所依据的企业层面数据的质量。在能够获取企业或家庭层面数据的国家，研究人员能够利用这些数据开展工作—并进而找出自己和对方研究中的优缺点。 我对此持非常积极的态度。
This is another example where firm-level data collected nationwide provides us with many opportunities to address important issues. To me, when I work on things—even now, with a collaborative project we’re involved in with the ADB and the Development Research Center, my biggest recommendation is still that researchers must have access to data. It’s unbelievably critical. You can ask for all the policy recommendations you want about what governments should do, but policy recommendations are only as good as the firm-level data underlying those recommendations. In countries where firm-level or household-level data have become accessible, researchers have been able to work with that data—identifying strengths and weaknesses, both in their own work and in each other’s. I mean that in a positive way.
这些东西为政策制定提供了基础。多年来，我也做了一些关于越南的研究，那里有很多公开可得的家庭级数据。研究人员能够使用并分析这些数据，从政策角度来看，我认为这非常重要。研究人员可以分析这些数据，得出自己的结论，并对研究结果的优劣进行辩论。
All of this provides the basis for policymaking. Over the years, I’ve done some work in Vietnam, where a lot of household-level data was much more publicly accessible. Researchers were able to use and analyze it, and in many ways, I thought that was extremely important from a policy perspective. Researchers could analyze the data, come up with their own conclusions, and debate the merits of the findings.
最终，这让我们能够更好地评估实际情况，以及哪些政策和措施在解决最重要问题时最为有效。因此，如果你想做政策评估研究，微观数据的可获取性至关重要。如果一个政府关注政策制定，那么确保研究者能够获取和利用微观数据同样至关重要。然而，有时做到这一点并非易事。
Ultimately, this allowed us—or allowed people—to come up with a better assessment of what was going on at the ground level, and the types of policies and treatments that would be most effective in addressing the most important issues. So, data availability is crucial if you want to do policy work. And if you’re a government concerned with policymaking, making data available is critical. But sometimes, that’s difficult.
Q5：很多人引用您的JDE文章并说您文章中用非常复杂的方法构建了跨年公司关联的非平衡面板。您在数据构建中遇到最大的困难是什么？
Q5: Many people citing your JDE paper say that you constructed the unbalanced panels in your paper in a very sophisticated way, linking companies across years. What is the biggest difficulty in data construction?
张轶凡做了大量的工作。困难在于，在这段时间内，许多公司都经历了大量的变化。这些变化包括一些公司可能被私有化，可能破产，也可能重新开始营业。因此，问题在于能否通过公司可能经历的所有权变更来追踪单个公司，这些变更对于公司的行为可能具有实质性和重要性。 后来，我们利用国家统计局的数据来追踪企业的时间变化及其所有权变动，以研究这些所有权变化的影响。
Yifan did a lot of that. The issue was, during this period of time, there were just lots of changes that individual firms were going through. Through this process of change, certain firms could be privatized, go bankrupt, or start a business again. So it was a matter of being able to track an individual firm through all these changes in ownership that the firm may have gone through, which could have been substantive and important to how the firm behaved. Later on, there has been work done using the NBS data to track firms over time and track their changes in ownership, to examine the impact these ownership changes had.
所以，这需要在公司层面进行非常细致的清理工作，尝试追踪每个公司变化，并尽可能利用当时互联网上可用的数据库或其他工具。如今，通过工商注册数据，可能会有更好的方法来实现这一点。然而，我们当时没有访问这些行政数据的权限，注册数据应该可以让我们更有效、更准确地追踪公司随时间的变化。
So, it was a matter of very careful, meticulous work at the firm level, trying to track changes in individual firms, and trying to take advantage of either databases or other tools that were certainly available at that time on the internet. Through the business registry today, there may be better ways to do this. We just didn’t have access to administrative data at that time that would have allowed us to link firms more effectively and accurately over time.
Q6：除此之外，您在本文的撰写和修改过程中遇到的最大的挑战是什么？（例如数据清洗、平减指数计算等问题）
Q6: Besides that, what was the biggest challenge you encountered in the writing and revision process of this article? (For example, issues like data cleaning, deflator calculation.）
我不确定是否算得上困难。我认为我们遇到的大多数困难可能都与数据相关。 我记得第一次展示这篇论文是在2008年，在匈牙利布达佩斯的一个欧洲会议上。Jo、张轶凡和我自己——实际上我们的妻子也都在场。Jo汇报了论文的早期版本，后来这篇论文成为了JDE论文。同时，我汇报在会议汇报了后来发表在2017年AER的早期论文（WTO accession and performance of Chinese manufacturing firms[3]）。即使在最早期的时候，我们已经注意到有关关税自由化对企业生产率影响的文献。
I don’t know that it was. I think most of the difficulties that we encountered were probably data-related. The first time I remember the paper being presented was in 2008, at a European conference in Budapest, Hungary. Johannes, Yifan, myself—actually, all of our wives were there too. Johannes presented an early version of the paper that later became the JDE paper. I presented something very early that ultimately became the 2017 AER paper. Even at that point in time, we knew about this literature on the effect of tariff liberalization on firm productivity.
所以，当我们开始这个项目时，我们都认为，“好吧，我们先开始吧，先记录和描述。”一开始，我们的研究关注点可能更多集中在关税自由化对生产率的影响上。但我们也意识到，在我们能够进行这一研究之前，我们需要先写好这篇第一篇论文，记录下生产率变化的所有事实。我不确定这在是否算一种困难，但我认为我们确实遇到了一些需要解决的数据问题。
So when we started the project, we both thought, “Okay, well, let’s begin, and let’s just document.” Maybe when we began, the interest may have been more about the paper looking at the effect of tariff liberalization on productivity. But it may have been the recognition on our part that, before we could even do that, we needed to write this first paper. We needed to document all the facts about what was happening with productivity. I don’t know if it was difficult in that sense. I think there were all these data issues that we had to deal with.
我们在2008年汇报这篇论文的时候只有到2005年的数据。后来，我们获得了2006年和2007年的数据。得到了这些数据，我们这样觉得，“好吧，如果把这几年的数据加进去，论文会更完善。”我并不记得在提交过程中遇到过太多困难，我也已经很久没有查看审稿报告了，所以我不确定他们具体说了什么，但我不认为投稿过程是极其困难的。其中的主要原因在于Jo对文献非常熟悉。比如从方法论的角度来看，我们该如何进行研究？我们是基于总产出还是基于增加来估计TFP？我们是要直接估计生产函数，还是直接采用一些现有的资本和劳动的产出弹性的估计？Jo也熟悉TFP增长的分解方法，帮助我们检测新企业、在位企业以及要素再配置分别对于TFP增长的贡献。因此其中关键是要循序渐进，确保数据得到正确汇总。我们做的第一个练习是，一旦获得所有企业层级数据，就确保这些企业层级数据的总结与统计年鉴相符。每年的统计年鉴中都会有一个基于这些企业层面数据的完整章节。
We presented the paper in 2008, and by that time, we may have only had data through 2005. Later on, data became available for 2006 and 2007. Once we got access to that data, we probably decided, “Okay, the paper will be better if we add those extra years.” I don’t remember there being a lot of difficulties with the submission process itself, and I haven’t looked at the review reports for a long time, so I don’t know exactly what they said. But I don’t believe it was a difficult path. A lot of that I mean, Jo knew the literature extremely well. From a methodological perspective, how are we going to go ahead and do this? Are we going to do it on a gross output basis, or a value-added basis? Are we going to estimate the underlying production function, or assume elasticities for capital and labor? Jo was also familiar with another body of literature looking at the decomposition exercises, which we use to examine the role of new firms, existing firms, and reallocations. So it was just a matter of working our way through bit by bit, making sure the data were aggregated properly. One of the first exercises we did was, once we had all the firm-level data, to ensure that the summary of the firm-level data ended up correctly reported in the statistical yearbook. Every year, in the statistical yearbook, there was an entire section about industry based on these firm-level data.**
我们在检测企业层级数据汇总后是否与与统计年鉴中报告的总量相匹配上花了不少时间。这是一个很好的测试，因此我们做了很多类似的测试。到最后，我们还花了一些时间试图协调和整合我称之为微观部分和宏观部分。即，我们有企业层级的数据，同时这些企业覆盖了工业部门大部分。我们想了解这些企业层面数据汇总后能反映什么，换句话说，我们是否能从微观部分的分析中提高对于宏观部分的理解。
We spent time making sure that the firm-level data we had was aggregated accurately to match the totals reported in the statistical yearbook. That was a good exercise, so there were lots of exercises of that sort that we did. One thing we also spent a fair amount of time on towards the end was trying to reconcile what I would call the micro and the macro. By that, I mean that we had firm-level data that aggregated up to a significant portion of the manufacturing or industrial sector. We wanted to see, okay, what does this aggregate up to, and what can we learn about the larger macro picture based on what we can observe at the micro level?
我们的论文中有一部分做了这种汇总，试图确保我们在企业层级数据中看到的内容与根据GDP增长、附加值增长和生产率等指标汇总出来的数据之间具有内部一致性，并与我们在国家层面或总体层面观察到的情况相比较。
There’s a section in the paper that does that kind of aggregation, trying to make sure that there is internal consistency between what we are seeing in the firm-level data and what is aggregated in terms of GDP growth, value-added growth, and productivity, compared with what we observe at the national or aggregate level.
Q7：我再次意识到合作以及和合作者技能之间的互补性的重要性。
Q7: I realized the second time the importance of collaboration and the complementary between the skills of co-authors.
在我整个职业生涯中，我一直很幸运能够找到志同道合的人，他们为我正在做的工作增添了我自己没有的新维度。 这算是一种技能吗？可能算吧。我从中受益了吗？肯定是的。当我回顾我的职业生涯时，我最高兴的一点就是我和许多人都有过合作。我和每一个我的合作者都至少发表了两篇论文，这意味着他们和我的第一次的合作应该是足够顺利的，以至于我们可以继续第二次合作。
Throughout my entire career, I’ve been fortunate to find people who share my interests and add new dimensions to the work I’m doing—dimensions I didn’t have on my own. Is that a skill? Probably. Have I benefited from it? Definitely. When I look back on my career, one of the things I’m most delighted by is the number of collaborations I’ve had. For almost every person I’ve worked with, we’ve published at least two papers together. That means the first collaboration must have been good enough for us to continue with a second project.
至于我现在正在做的工作，我认为合作是至关重要的。 很少有一个人能具备所需的所有技能——对数据的洞察力、对制度的理解、对问题的把握、研究方法的知识以及具体执行的技术能力。对于一个人来说要掌握的东西太多了。虽然我有一些同事能同时做到上述所有，但这依然是很大的挑战。因此，合作已经成为一种常态，特别是对于像中国这样复杂的议题，甚至是更广泛的研究领域。
As for the current work I’m doing, I believe collaboration is essential. It’s very rare for one person to possess all the skills needed—insight into the data, understanding of the institutions, clarity on the questions, methodological knowledge, and the technical skills to execute tasks. That’s a lot for one person to handle. While we have colleagues who can do this, it’s still a heavy load. So collaboration has become the norm, especially when working on complex topics like China, and likely in economics more broadly.
Q8：您认为让这篇文章这么有影响力的主要原因是什么？
Q8: What do you think is the main reason why this article has been influential?
我认为，最重要的原因可能是因为这项工作的一些数据清理工作使得人们能够有效地使用NBS数据。 这是我的感受。从我个人的角度来看，这个文章中同样重要，甚至更重要的是我们得出的一些发现。例如，全要素生产率增长中新企业的贡献很高，而企业退出或将要素配置的贡献很低，但后者正是美国全要素生产率增长的一个巨大来源。大家这一点的关注较少。
I would say that probably the most important reason is because it did a lot of the things that people needed to do in order to effectively use the data. That’s how I feel about it. From my own perspective, what’s equally, or perhaps even more important than the specific messages, are some of the findings we’ve made. For instance, high productivity growth, the important contribution of new firms, and the fact that there wasn’t much productivity coming from exit or from reallocating resources to better firms, which is a huge source of productivity growth in the United States. People have paid much less attention to this aspect.
在我们做的工作中，我指的是与Kjetil和Gueorgui的合作，与戴若尘、Kjetil和Gueorgui的张晓波在serial entrepreneurship的研究，这些都与新企业、进入过程以及企业如何被选中进入市场密切相关。它还涉及到企业动态——这些都是我认为在分析中国的经济动态或中国经济活力丧失的话题时极为重要的部分。
In the work we’ve done, I mean, the work with Kjetil and Gueorgui, the work with Ruochen, Kjetil, Gueorgui, and Xiaobo, on serial entrepreneurship, all of that is deeply connected to new firms, the entry process, and how firms are selected for entry. It also touches on firm dynamics—extremely important topics for any story we want to tell about China’s dynamism or the loss of dynamism in the Chinese economy.
因此，我认为这篇文章被引用是因为人们使用了其中的数据，并需要一个参考文献来验证他们处理数据的科学性。但从我的角度来看，这篇文章传递的信息同样重要，甚至更为重要。已经有其他的论文，如AER上那篇，研究了工业化对全要素生产率和价格加成的影响，以及新企业在这一机制中的重要性。后来与Kjetile和Gueorgui（Barriers to Entry and Regional Growth in China. Review of Economic Studie），甚至我们现在在做的一些新研究——这些都涉及到这个过程和企业动态。如果你想了解中国发生了什么，必须从这些方面开始。
So, I would say it gets cited because people use the data and need a reference to legitimize the data they happen to use. From my perspective, the message is just as, if not more, important. There have been other papers, such as the one in the AER, looking at the effects of industrialization on productivity and markups, and how important new firms were to that mechanism. The later work with Kjetil and Gueorgui, and even some of the new things we’re doing—it’s all about processes and firm dynamics. If you want to understand what’s happening in China, this is where you have to start.
我们这个工作会让人们更容易使用这些数据，并以他们认为合适的方式进行分析。虽然并不一定要在我们已经做的基础上进一步拓展，但我们提供了一个巨大的公共产品。我们只是让人们更容易使用这些数据。
In some sense, I would say, we’ve made it easier for people to use the data and approach it in ways that they see fit. Instead of necessarily building on what we’ve done, which is fine, we’ve provided a huge public good. We’ve just made it a lot easier for people to be able to use the data.
Q9：除了这些数据本身之外，它传达的信息也很重要。但似乎其中信息还没有被学术界完全理解，对吗？
Q9:Besides this data, the message is also important. But it is somehow not fully understood by the academic, right?
我同意你的观点，我还有一篇类似观点的论文，是我和朱晓冬一起写的，2000年在Journal of Political Economy上发表[4]。那篇论文试图解释中国的经济繁荣与衰退周期，以及增长和国有部门再分配之间的紧张关系。对我来说，那篇论文对理解1980年代的紧张局势、1990年代的政策改革，甚至如今的形势来说至关重要。从某种意义上来说，这是一篇我认为花了很多时间才完成的论文，我觉得它准确地阐明了总环境中的对立性质。我不认为那篇论文的核心信息已经被充分吸收。至今仍有人讲述1980年代中国通货膨胀的起源，而他们的观点对我来说是根本错误的，忽视了我们所观察到的通货膨胀的真正来源。
I would agree with you, and I have one other paper where I have similar thoughts. It’s a paper I did with Xiaodong, which came out in 2000 in the Journal of Political Economy. That paper tries to explain China’s boom-bust cycles and the tensions between growth and redistribution to the state sector. To me, that paper is fundamental in making sense of the tensions of the 1980s, the policy reforms of the 1990s, and even today. And in some sense, that’s one of those papers where I feel like we spent so much time on it, and I think we got right what the nature of the contradictions was in the overall environment. And I don’t feel as if the message of that paper has fully been incorporated. People still tell stories about the sources of inflation in China in the 1980s that, to me, are fundamentally incorrect and miss the true source of inflation that we happened to observe.
所以，这点很重要，对我们想要详细描述的这些更宏大的叙事也很重要。关于新企业进入的问题我也有同样的观点。我认为新企业进入的有趣之处，（这是我问自己的问题，也是我希望我们能够解决的问题），是即使在JDE的论文中，我们也能看到，随着周期的结束，新企业的贡献在某种程度上开始逐渐消退。所以你会不禁会想，这对中国来说是否是一个一次性回报？曾经有一段时间，许多新兴的、主要是私营企业的准入受到诸多限制，而后来这些限制逐渐放宽。突然间，新的企业开始进入市场，我们看到了巨大的生产率增长。但随着时间的推移，似乎新企业不再扮演同样的角色了。
So, and that’s important. It’s important to these larger narratives that we want to tell. I would say the same thing here about new firms. I think the interesting thing about new firms, and it’s a question I ask myself and hope we’ll be able to address, is that even in the JDE papers, we can begin to see that towards the end of the period, the contribution of new firms is starting to die out a little bit. And so the question you start to ask yourself is, well, was this just a kind of one-time gain that China was able to realize? There was a period where there were lots of constraints on these new, largely private sector firms being able to enter, and those constraints got relaxed. All of a sudden, you get these new firms entering, and you see this huge productivity gain. But as we move forward, it looks like new firms aren’t playing that same role.
所以问题是，我们是否已经耗尽了这些机会，还是有其他新的限制因素出现，导致新企业无法发挥重要作用，特别是在新兴产业中。这一点本身依然是一个重要的问题。因为如果我们回顾中国四十年的发展，我们会看到很多某些时期的增长是由我所称之为一次性回报主导的例子。比如农业部门的改革，通过引入责任制，带来了巨大的一次性增益。同时，还有很多其他配套改革。
So the question is, have we just exhausted this backlog of opportunities, or have other constraints emerged that are preventing new firms from playing an important role, especially in emerging industries. That, in itself, remains an important question. Because if we look at China’s development over forty years, we see many cases where growth during certain periods was dominated by what I would call one-time gains. You look at the reform of the agricultural sector. You get these huge one-time gains because you introduce the responsibility system. And at the same time, there are a lot of other complementary reforms.
Q10：对于动态过程或资源配置的研究，我知道您也有一篇关于农业资源配置的论文。能否分享一下您的想法，比如在这个领域中的研究难题或关键兴趣点？我觉得可以鼓励更多年轻人关注这个研究领域。
Q10:In terms of dynamic processes or general resource allocation, I know you also have a paper on resource allocation in agriculture. Could you share some of your thoughts on this, such as the research puzzles or key areas of interest in this field? I believe this could encourage more young people to follow this area of research.
对我来说一个重要的问题是，在中国我们并没有看到要素再配置对生产率增长发挥重要作用。而且，如果我们谈论的新企业带来的生产率增长只是一次性的，那么人们本应预期的是未来生产率增长不再主要来源于新企业，而是来源于资源转向那些真正表现出色的企业。但在中国的背景下，我们似乎并没有看到这种现象，这仍然需要得到证实和确认。
Yeah, so, to me, one of the important questions is that, in the Chinese context, we just don’t see the reallocation of resources to better firms playing an important role in terms of productivity growth. And perhaps, if the productivity gains we were talking about from new firms were kind of one-time gains, then what one might have expected is that future productivity growth would come much less from new firms. Instead, resources should be moved to those firms that are truly the best. But we don’t seem to be seeing that in the Chinese context, and this remains to be confirmed and established.
但如果真是这样，那么就引发了一系列问题：为什么资源没有被配置到最优秀的企业？我可以列举出三到五种可能的解释对于为什么会是这种情况，但我不确定哪一种是最主要的原因。可能不同的部门之间存在差异，甚至不同产业之间，或者产业与第三产业之间也存在差异。但在我看来，这些是必须解决的首要问题。
But if that is the case, then it raises a whole host of questions: why aren’t resources being allocated to the best firms? And I can probably list three, four, or even five alternative explanations for why this might be the case. I’m not sure which one is the most prominent. There could be differences across sectors. There could be differences between industries, or even between industries and services in the tertiary sector. But to me, these are first-order issues that need to be addressed.
如果考虑到中国的增长放缓，以及生产率增长在整个经济中放缓的现象，随之而来的一些重大问题就浮现出来：为什么生产率增长会放缓？为什么放缓得如此明显？同时，我们也看到，中国在技能培训和人力资本方面做出了巨大投资——这些巨大的投资，在其他条件不变的情况下，本应有助于提高生产率。但我们似乎并没有看到这一点。
If you take into account the fact that growth in China has slowed and that productivity growth has slowed across the entire economy, big questions arise: why is productivity growth slowing? And why is it slowing as much as it has? At the same time, we see enormous investments being made in training and human capital—huge investments that, all else equal, should have helped enhance and increase productivity. But we don’t seem to be seeing that.
对我来说，这似乎是一个价值连城的研究问题，如果你对中国的增长感兴趣，这个问题应该是核心问题。显然，有些事情的发生极大地减缓了这一进程。看起来，这一减缓发生得比其他一些成功实现从低收入到中等收入国家，再到高收入国家转变的国家要早得多。
To me, this seems like one of those trillion-yuan questions that should be at the forefront of discussions if you’re interested in growth in China. Something has clearly happened that has dramatically slowed the process. It appears that this slowdown occurred much earlier in China’s development compared to other countries that have successfully navigated their way from a low-income to a middle-income country, and then to a higher-income country.
中国的这一增长过程比预期更早的时候就已经放慢了。对我而言，这是一个应该引起高度关注的问题。它应该成为对发展和增长问题感兴趣的人们讨论的核心。对我和我的同事来说这些正是我们试图聚焦的问题，我们正在努力寻找方法收集数据来解决。从我的角度来看，这对中国政策制定者来说尤为重要。
So this process seems to have slowed down in China at a much earlier stage of development than one might expect. To me, this is a question that should be at the forefront of discussions. It’s something that people who are interested in development and growth issues should be focused on. For me, and for my colleagues I’m working with, these are some of the key questions we’re trying to focus on, and we’re trying to find ways to gather the data that will allow us to address them. It’s particularly important for Chinese policymakers from my perspective.
其他国家总能从中国的经验中汲取宝贵的教训。中国在很多方面都很独特，不仅在改革前的经济体系上，而且考虑到它的规模。虽然需要谨慎，但中国的经验对其他国家仍然有宝贵的借鉴意义。许多其他国家确实试图从中国的经验中学习，了解如何制定可能最适合长期维持增长的政策。
There are always lessons for other countries to learn from China. If you take a look, China is quite unique in many ways, both in terms of its economic system before the reforms started and given its size. One needs to be a bit careful, but there are still valuable lessons in the Chinese experience for other countries to learn from. Other countries do try to learn from China’s experience in terms of how they should shape policies that might be most appropriate for sustaining growth over long periods of time.
Q11：最后一个问题是您觉得如何提出新的研究想法。我觉得您已经提供了很好的答案。包括构建一个准确的典型事实，并与数据进行互动，还有结合实地调研。
Q11:The final question is how you suggest to come up with new research ideas. I think you have provided a wonderful answer about how you come up with ideas. I think the answer is you need to construct a fact, and you interact with the data, and go to the field.
是的，我认为这些因素都很重要，但我想我可以补充一点，那就是阅读，大量地阅读，还有保持好奇心。 我从大量阅读关于日本经验的材料中受益匪浅。我也从我所做的历史工作中获得了很多启发。我将发展视为一个过程，一种历史进程。这种看法影响了我对中国及其早期发展的思考。还影响了我对1978年之后中国的看法。我认为这些都是过程，许多事情同时发生并相互作用。但它毕竟是一个过程，而你要做的就是弄清楚这个过程是什么——政治、经济和公司层面的动态如何交织和汇聚。
Yeah, I think all of those things are important, but I guess maybe the other thing I would add is reading. Broad reading, and just being curious. And I’ve certainly benefited, over time, from having read a lot about the experience of Japan. I’ve benefited a lot from the historical work I’ve done. The way in which I view development as a process. It’s a process, almost a historical type process, and this has influenced the way I think about China and its earlier development.That has influenced the way I think about China post-1978. I think of these things as processes, with lots of things going on at the same time and interacting. But it’s a process, and what you’re trying to do is figure out what that process is—how politics, economics, and firm-level dynamics interact and aggregate.
我认为，某种程度上，阅读越多，你就越能思考，“这个如何呢？那个如何呢？”所以这是多方面综合的因素。我们都受时间限制——一天只有那么多小时。但阅读关于任何国家的经验，尤其是中国的经验，关于改革的经验，甚至是50年代、60年代、70年代的背景，我认为仍然有很多工作要做。关于80年代、90年代和2000年代的基本问题，我们可能仍未完全准确地把握，还有很多需要回顾的东西，那些我们认为已经明确的东西，可能还需要重新审视，并且要用新的眼光来看待。现在回顾80年代和90年代，转眼间已经过去了20或30年。而也许再过20或30年，我们将会有更多的视角，能够看到我们现在没能察觉到的事情。所以，我认为一直回顾和反思自己经验中的东西很重要，比如美国在经济或政治方面的经历。这总是值得回顾和反思，不论是50年前还是100年前的经历，总有人会以新的角度来解读那些东西，联系点滴，讲述新的故事。
I think the more you read, in some sense, it helps you say, “Well, what about this? What about that?” So, it’s a combination of things. I mean, we’re all constrained enormously in terms of time—there are only so many hours in a day. But, you know, reading about the experiences of any country, and I would say especially in the context of China, the reforms, but even in the context of the ’50s, ’60s, and ’70s, I still think there’s a lot left to be done.There are fundamental questions about the ’80s, the ’90s, and the 2000s that we probably don’t have 100% accurate. There’s still a lot more go back and revisit what we thought we knew and to look at it in a new light. And you know, now, looking at the ’80s and ’90s, all of a sudden, it’s 20 or 30 years later. And maybe 20 or 30 years from now, we will have the perspective and vantage point we need to see things we couldn’t see when we were really close to them. So, I think always going back, and what I’ve learned from my own experience—what the U.S. goes through economically or politically—it’s always valuable to go back and reflect on things, whether it’s 50 years ago or 100 years ago. Some people are always reinterpreting those things, connecting the dots in new ways, and telling new stories.
这些新的故事将更好地联系起当前的情况。但归根结底，它们可能讲述了更有趣的故事，而这些恰好是我们感兴趣的。这是一个持续的过程。我认为我们做的很多事情基本上是正确的，但我也坦然接受我们不可避免地存在遗漏的事实。但也正是如此，我们的工作才变得有趣和令人兴奋。因为知识是可以被打破的，别人总是有可能找到一个更好的故事。 他们可能会发现你做的事情有漏洞，但这没关系，这只是我们所参与的过程的一部分。当别人提供了更好的解释，找到一种新的方法，或者更好的解释方式时，我们不应该感到尴尬或沮丧。对我来说，那才是进步。但这都是我们所参与的过程的一部分。
These new stories will connect more recent dots. But in the end, they may tell more interesting narratives and stories, which we happen to be interested in. It’s a continual process. I think a lot of what we did was basically right, but I’m also prepared for the fact that we may have missed things. That’s what makes it really interesting and exciting, because knowledge can always be disrupted. Someone else can always find a better story. They might find holes in what you’ve done, and that’s fine. That’s just part of the process we’re involved in. One shouldn’t be embarrassed or upset when someone offers a better explanation, finds a new way, or a better way of explaining things. To me, that’s progress.
学者简介：
Loren Brandt是多伦多大学的Noranda Chair Professor，专门研究中国经济。他还是IZA（劳动研究所）的研究员。他在主要经济刊物上广泛发表了有关中国经济的文章，并在中国和越南参与了大量的家庭和企业调查工作。他与Thomas Rawski合作完成了《中国电力和电信行业的政策、监管和创新》（剑桥大学出版社，2019 年），这是一项跨学科研究，分析了政府政策对中国电力和电信行业的影响。他还是《中国经济大转型》（剑桥大学出版社，2008 年）的共同编辑和主要撰稿人，该书对中国过去三十年出人意料的经济繁荣进行了综合分析。Brandt还是牛津大学出版社五卷本《经济史百科全书》（2003 年）的领域编辑之一。他目前的研究重点是创业和企业动态、产业政策和创新以及经济增长和结构变化等问题。
Loren Brandt is the Noranda Chair Professor of Economics at the University of Toronto specializing in the Chinese economy. He is also a research fellow at the IZA (The Institute for the Study of Labor) in Bonn, Germany. He has published widely on the Chinese economy in leading economic journals and been involved in extensive household and enterprise survey work in both China and Vietnam. With Thomas Rawski, he completed Policy, Regulation, and Innovation in China’s Electricity and Telecom Industries (Cambridge University Press, 2019), an interdisciplinary effort analyzing the effect of government policy on the power and telecom sectors in China. He was also co-editor and major contributor to China’s Great Economic Transformation (Cambridge University Press, 2008), which provides an integrated analysis of China’s unexpected economic boom of the past three decades. Brandt was also one of the area editors for Oxford University Press’ five-volume Encyclopedia of Economic History (2003). His current research focuses on issues of entrepreneurship and firm dynamics, industrial policy and innovation and economic growth and structural change.
参考文献
[1]Brandt, Loren, Johannes Van Biesebroeck, and Yifan Zhang. “Creative accounting or creative destruction? Firm-level productivity growth in Chinese manufacturing.” Journal of Development Economics 97.2 (2012): 339-351.
[2]Brandt, Loren, Gueorgui Kambourov, and Kjetil Storesletten. “Barriers to entry and regional economic growth in China.” Review of Economic Studies. Forthcoming.
[3]Brandt, Loren, Johannes Van Biesebroeck, Luhang Wang, and Yifan Zhang. “WTO accession and performance of Chinese manufacturing firms.” American Economic Review 107.9 (2017): 2784-2820.
[4]Brandt, Loren, and Xiaodong Zhu. “Redistribution in a decentralized economy: Growth and inflation in China under reform.” Journal of Political Economy 108.2 (2000): 422-439.
| 责任编辑 | 戴若尘 |
| 整理翻译 | 张诗怡 |
| 校对 | Loren Brandt |